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Abstract 
A remarkable degree of self-sufficiency is a distinguishing feature of the typical Third World 
family farm. However, many family farms deviate from this pattern and engage in transactions 
involving land and labor. The question is why some households use land and labor markets 
while others do not. We posit that markets may function imperfectly and discourage 
households from participation. We model imperfections in terms of transaction costs which 
drive a household-specific wedge between sales and purchase prices of factors. When the 
shadow price of a factor falls inside this range, the household has no incentive to adjust that 
particular margin. The frictionless model emerges as a limiting case in which sales, purchase 
and shadow prices are equal. The empirical work is based on data from a 1973 nationwide 
survey in Turkey. The subsample of owner-cultivators is sorted into a 3x3 table according to 
the adjustments that took place on the land margin (lease out, do not participate, lease in), and 
the labor margin (hire out, do not participate, hire in), and the determinants of the observed 
pattern of adjustments are investigated. The estimating equations are obtained from the 
theoretical model by treating the shadow, sales, and purchase prices as latent variables and 
expressing them as linear functions of observables. We use an unrestricted bivariate ordered 
probit specification and estimate the parameters using maximum likelihood methods. This 
procedure uncovers the links between observables and the transaction costs faced by each 
household, making it possible to confront transactions cost theory with real world data. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: 
Third World agriculture has provided neoclassical economists with fertile soil for 
sowing theories of incomplete and imperfect markets. During the past decade or 
so, it has been postulated that certain markets -- such as markets for land, hired 
labor and draft animals, insurance and credit markets, even product markets -- are 
outright missing, or at best, function imperfectly. Asymmetries of information 
and problems of moral hazard have been identified as the primary reasons behind 
market failure. The insights gleaned from the new models have resulted in 
dramatic shifts in views on agrarian institutions and policy prescriptions.' 
When confronted with the evidence, a paradigm built on the premise that 
certain markets are missing quickly runs into empirical difficulties, just as one 
which postulates the existence of a complete set of markets for all inputs and 
products. In fact, many of the markets identified as missing in theoretical 
models do exist, but are not utilized by all agents. The empirically relevant 
question, then, is not whether or not markets exist, but why market participation 
is not universal. 
Our paper is concerned with a particular context in which the general issues 
we have identified have been vigorously debated: the literature on the family 
farm. The self-sufficiency and resilience of the family farm, despite significant 
increases in commercial orientation in the product market, have posed serious 
challenges for neoclassical economists. Once viewed as backward and inefficient, 
the family farm has come to be identified as an optimal operational unit because 
of its ability to circumvent the incentive problems that organizations face, and 
to adjust to a diverse production environment in which limited scale economies are 
present.2 While a remarkable degree of self-sufficiency is indeed a 
distinguishing feature of the typical family farm, transactions involving land 
and/or labor are not uncommon. Short-term transfer of use-rights to land (in the 
form of sharecropping or fixed-rent tenancy) as well as contracts for casual and 
permanent labor are observed in diverse agricultural environments. An important 
question that arises naturally is why some households use land and labor markets 
while others do not. 
To confront the challenge, we adopt the approach that markets may function in 
it fashion that discourages certain households from participation. Our theoretical 
framework is based on the transaction costs formulation of de Janvry, Fafchamps 
and Sadoulet (1991) in which market imperfections drive a household-specific wedge 
between sales, and purchase prices of factors. When the shadow price of a factor 
falls inside this range, the household has no incentive to adjust along that 
particular margin.3 The perfectly functioning market model emerges as a limiting 
r See the collections by Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1984), Singh et at. (1986), 
Bardhan (1989), and review articles such as Bell (1991), Hoff (1991), Otsuka el 
al. (1992). 
2 See Otsuka et al. (1992). Based on the 1970 World Census of Agriculture, Otsuka 
et al. report that 80 percent of farms and 60 percent of farmland around the world 
are under cultivation by the land owner. The only exception to the general 
pattern comes from the African continent, where communal ownership dominates 
(Table 1). 
' This characterization is also used by Seavey (1987). Seavey does not write down 
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case as transaction costs are driven to zero, so that sales, purchase and shadow 
prices are equal. To obtain the estimating equations we treat the shadow prices, 
as well as the sales and purchase prices, as latent variables and express them as 
linear functions of observables. We use an unrestricted bivariate ordered probit 
specification and estimate the parameters using Maximum Likelihood methods. This 
procedure uncovers the links between the observables and the widths of the price 
bands, and quantifies the transaction costs faced by each household (up to a scale 
parameter). 
The idea that transactions are costly, and might limit market participation 
is not new (see Datta and Nugent. 1989). Transaction cost formulations have been 
used by Bell and Sussangkarn (1988), Pereira and Sumner (1990), Shaban (1993), and 
Skoufias (1995) for analyzing land leasing decisions, by Lopez (1986) and Skoufias 
(1994) for studying adjustments to the labor margin, and by Seavey (1987) for 
studying adjustments to both margins.` What distinguishes our methodology is the 
direct connection we establish between transaction costs theory and its 
application, facilitated by a novel econometric formulation. Our model nests the 
entire continuum from the extreme situation of missing markets, to the extreme 
situation of perfectly functioning markets and offers a suitable framework for 
testing hypotheses motivated by the theoretical debates. 
Notable in this regard is our ability to examine the adjustments to the land 
and labor margins jointly. Despite an abundance of theoretical models that 
underscore the interdependent nature of the adjustments that take place along 
various margins, the bulk of the empirical evidence comes from studies of 
individual margins. In their recent review, Otsuka, Chuma and Hayami (1992) 
underscore this point and contend that "...separate analyses of land and labor 
contracts have resulted in theoretical confusion as well as questionable 
interpretations of empirical data." We remedy this shortcoming and shed light on 
the issue of what can, and what cannot be claimed using partial models which focus 
on a single margin. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we examine 
the observed patterns of factor adjustment in our data set and establish the 
shortcomings of the approaches that posit perfectly functioning markets on the one 
extreme, and missing markets on the other. We present a theoretical model which 
subsumes Will extremes in section 3, and characterize the equilibrium for a given 
family farm. In section 4 we operationalize the theoretical model, discuss the 
identification problems and derive the likelihood function. The hypotheses 
motivated by our reading of the literature are formalized in section 5. 
Description of the data and the empirical setting constitutes the subject of 
section 6. We present the estimation results and test the hypotheses in section 
7. In the final section we take stock of what has been achieved. 
an explicit model but nevertheless provides an extremely thorough theoretical 
discussion. We benefited immensely from reading her dissertation, which was 
brought to our attention during the 1994 NEUDC Conference at Yale University. 
-r Benjamin (1992) and Jacoby (1993) discuss models in which efficiency differences 
induce the off-farm wage for family labor to be different from the cost of hiring 
others' labor. However they do not invoke a transaction costs interpretation. 
Pant (1983) and Nabi (1985) test hypotheses motivated by transaction cost 
formulations but do not model non-participation formally. 
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2. OBSERVED PATTERNS OF OWNER-CULTIVATION: 
Consider the data presented in Table 1, which is based on a nationwide survey 
conducted in Turkey in 1973. In that table we subdivided our sample of 1015 land 
owners who self-cultivate (henceforth owner-cultivators) according to the 
adjustments that took place during the last growing season on the land margin 
(lease out, do not participate, lease in, simultaneously lease in and out), and on 
the labor margin (hire out, do not participate, hire in, simultaneously hire in 
and out).5 We first focus on the figures printed in bold. 
About 43 percent of the households in the sample refrain from making any 
factor adjustments during the growing season; they cultivate using their existing, 
resources and do not market any portion of their land and labor endowments. 
Approximately 14 percent of the households adjust the land margin only, while 30 
percent adjust the labor margin only. The remaining 13 percent of the households 
adjust both margins. Clearly, markets for short-term transactions do exist -- a 
majority of the owner-cultivators turn to markets and adjust land/labor ratios. 
What do we make of the sizable proportion of households who do not adjust 
either margin? One possibility is that these households already have the desired 
factor ratios, which they may have attained by altering their endowments of land 
and labor over a period of time. Our data set provides some useful clues about 
the likelihood of this explanation. The figures entered in the cells of Table I 
in italics show the (conditional) distribution of households who had at least one 
member migrate over the five year period 1968-73. The third set of figures shows 
the (conditional) distribution of households who either bought or sold land over 
the ten year period 1963-73.6 If households refrain from making short-run factor 
adjustments because they have made long-term adjustments, we would expect to find 
these (conditional) joint distributions concentrated in the (ah = 0, a1i = 0) cell, 
or at least the marginal distributions concentrated in the (a, = 0) or (a(1 = 0) 
cells. Evidently this is not the case.? 
A widely accepted conjecture in the literature is that tenancy arises in 
response to imperfections in land or labor markets. One version of this 
conjecture builds on the widely observed pattern that land sales rarely take place 
5 The labor margin can be adjusted for the entire growing season (permanent labor) 
or for part of it (seasonal or casual labor). To avoid problems associated with 
too many small (even zero) cell sizes, we do not distinguish between the two. 
6 The time intervals for long-run adjustment were dictated by data constraints. 
All permanent moves past the village boundary were considered as migrations. 
7 Based on the data presented on the margins of Table 1, the hypothesis of 
independence of the long-run (LR) regimes (adjust/do not adjust) and the short-run 
(SR) regimes (adjust down/do not adjust/adjust up) could not be rejected. Chi- 
squared tests of pairwise independence yielded the following p-values: 
SR-Labor SR-Land 
LR-Labor .879 .102 
LR-Land .495 .854 
Results from additional tests are reported in section 7. 
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(Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1984). It suggests that tenancy can function as a 
substitute mechanism for attaining efficiency when land distribution cannot be 
altered otherwise.8 A second justifies tenancy on the premise that moral hazard 
problems associated with hired labor or constraints on labor supply (demand) 
during slack (peak) seasons (Bardhan, 1984, Ch.7; Bell and Sussangkarn. 1988; 
Pereira and Sumner, 1991). This version may be termed the spillover hypothesis, 
in that inability to adjust on one margin renders adjustment on another more 
likely. 
The independence of the short- and long-run adjustment patterns on the land 
margin in Table 1 calls the validity of the substitution explanation into 
question. The conditional adjustment probabilities shown in Table 2 reveal that 
the data also reject the spillover hypothesis. Given that the household has not 
adjusted the land margin (a,, = 0), we find that it is more likely not to adjust 
the labor margin. Given that the household has not adjusted the labor margin 
(r, = 0), we see that it is much more likely not to adjust the land margin. 
To recapitulate, neither a standard factor adjustment model which assumes 
perfectly functioning markets, nor models which place the burden of adjustment on 
one market because of imperfections in another, explain the observed patterns in 
the case of Turkey. It is, of course, conceivable that both explanations are 
partial truths, in that each applies to a particular segment of the sample. What 
is needed is a model which explains why certain households engage in market 
transactions, while others do not (or cannot), in an internally consistent 
fashion. 
3. A THEORY OF MARKET PARTICIPATION: 
Consider an agricultural household which can produce a single commodity using 
three inputs: land, labor and farming expertise. The first two are assumed to be 
tradable, while the last one is assumed to be non-tradable. The production 
function is assumed to have the usual properties.9 In addition, marginal products 
of land and labor are assumed to be increasing functions of farming expertise. In 
this three-input model, whether the tradable input margins need to be altered (and 
in which direction) depends not only on the land/labor ratio and the relative 
prices of land and labor, but also on the amount of the non-tradable input the 
household has. If a household has abundant farming expertise, the shadow prices 
of land and/or labor are high; the household would like to hire in additional 
units of the scarce inputs and spread out its expertise. 
Whether a household actually alters input margins depends on the costs of 
making the adjustment -- that is, on the costs of transacting with other agents. 
Following Bardhan (1989b) and Datta and Nugent (1989), we define transaction costs 
very broadly, to include the costs of information, negotiation, monitoring, 
coordination, and enforcement of contracts. In the spirit of de Janvry et of. 
(1991), we allow for the possibility that rental prices of land and labor, 
adjusted for the costs of transacting, may be different depending on whether the 
8 Binswanger and Rosenzweig are careful to indicate that the absence of a sales 
market for land is not sufficient to usher in tenancy (1984, p.15). Elsewehere 
they point out that distress sales of land are likely to worsen landholding 
inequality and, can therefore exacerbate the use of tenancy (1986, p.527). 
9 Letting q(d,h; f) denote the production function with d = land, h = labor, 
f = farming expertise, we assume q11 > 0, qh > 0, qdd < 0, qhh < 0, qdh > 0. 
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household is on the demand or supply side of the market. In the case of labor, 
search and commuting costs may reduce the effective wage a household member can 
earn by working off the farm. Recruitment and supervision costs may in turn 
increase the effective wage of a worker hired by the household.10 In the case of 
land, the effective rental price of land leased out to a tenant may be lower 
because the tenant is likely to avoid the necessary measures for preserving land 
quality, maintaining the farm roads and the irrigation ditches, unless he is 
monitored. 11 When land is leased in, set-up costs may have to be incurred before 
it is engaged in production. For example, if own and leased land are in different 
locations, transportation costs have to be taken into consideration. If a 
sharecropping contract is adopted, costs of enforcement have to be figured in, so 
that input costs and the output are shared according to contract stipulations.12 
There are other costs or constraints which may hinder the household from 
increasing its operation size. For example, available land area might not equal 
area needed. At times working capital constraints could exclude households from 
participation.13 Finally, household-specific price differences may also emerge 
because of differences in attitudes towards risk. In short, transactions are 
costly, and may be influenced by a horde of exogenous and endogenous factors. 
This results in differences between the market price of a factor and its effective 
value to the prospective traders. 
10 Transaction costs are especially high in the seasonal labor market where workers 
often move from one area to the other, and from one employer to another. In 
Turkey seasonal agricultural workers are often recruited through a middleman, 
termed el(i (messenger). The middleman contracts with fellow villagers for a 
specified duration. In family farms supervisory tasks are usually carried out by 
family workers, who spend all, or part of their time organizing and monitoring the 
activities of the hired workers. If workers are hired through a middleman, he 
also keeps an eye on the workers. The implicit threat of losing future contracts 
helps alleviate the incentive problems. 
11 Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986, pp.517-8) argue that these costs are minimal 
because damage is easily visible, and maintenance requirements are low (except 
when trees and other perennials are present). Allen and Lueck (1992a) analyze 
farmland leases in the Midwestern region of the United States and conclude that 
factors such as information about the reputations of the members of the 
agricultural community, preference for long term relationships, and mutual respect 
for common law mitigate the need for complicated contracts. Aksoy (1984, p.89), 
however, offers evidence that the concerns mentioned in the text are entertained 
by Turkish landowners, who may exercise their traditional right to examine the 
leased property, and even check on the farm operations. 
12 In their examination of agricultural contracts used in Midwestern United States, 
Allen and Lueck (1992b, p.402) report that the costs of measuring and dividing the 
output, and adjusting for quality differences are important features that 
distinguish share contracts. Aksoy (1986, p.89) underscores similar concerns and 
cites a Turkish proverb: "he who does not leave his footmarks in the field closes 
his eyes during harvest time." 
13 Put differently, access to capital markets may be unequal. The literature 
identifies land as the most important form of collateral (Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig, 1986: Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986). Empirical evidence from Turkey 
indicates that the amount of credit that can be raised is proportional to the 
amount of land owned (Ministry of Agriculture, 1967). 
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Define p as the market price of a factor, and let p and p+ 
respectively denote the effective price of a factor when it is sold (-), and when 
it is purchased (+). Here and. below, we use tildes (--) to denote quantities which 
are known to the household, but unknown to the econometrician. We assume 
0 < p- < p < p+ and posit that the range [p-, p+] may be narrower or wider. 
depending on the agroclimatic conditions faced by the household and the cropping 
system it chooses. The latter will in turn depend on the endowments of the 
household and its agronomic environment. For a given level of transaction costs, 
the price band [p-, p+] may slide up or down along the real line depending on 
how forces of supply and demand impact p, the observed market price. 
When a non-trivial price band [p-, p+], p+ - p- > 0 exists for one or more 
factors, market prices are no longer sufficient in determining the optimal input 
mix. In this case both the household-specific costs of transacting, and the 
household specific-shadow price IT of the factor figure in the household's 
decision. Depending on where its shadow price falls relative to the price band, a 
household may become a (net) seller, a non-participant. or a (net) buyer. 
Let (ad,ah) E AxA denote the adjustment regime of the household where the 
set A = {-,+,0} denotes the alternatives available to the household. That is, 
a] (i = d for land, j = h for labor) takes on a value in the set A depending on 
whether the household adjusts the jth margin downwards (-), upwards (+), or not at 
all (0). The characterization of the possible factor adjustment regimes in terms 
of the relationship between shadow prices, and effective sales and purchase prices 
are given in Table 3.14 
According to our formulation, a household which is constrained from entering 
the sellers or buyers side of the market faces an infinite price in that market. 
In the extreme situation when sales or purchase markets are missing, all 
households face an infinite price in that market. Note that unlike models which 
focus on commodity or factor-specific market failure (see, for example, Strauss, 
1996), the present formulation views the problem as being household-specific. As 
better infrastructure, more efficient methods of monitoring, and mechanisms for 
information acquisition become available, some or all of the costs of transaction 
can be driven to zero. The market functions smoothly -- in the manner depicted by 
the standard supply-demand model -- when p- = p = p+. In this friction less 
setting the same market price p determines the actions of all households. 
4. AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF SIMULTANEOUS FACTOR ADJUSTMENTS 
The key to our formulation is that markets for contracting land and labor exist, 
but are selectively utilized. If the shadow price of a factor falls inside a non- 
trivial price band that emerges due to transaction costs, there is no incentive to 
trade that factor. To operationalize our theoretical model, we turn to a latent 
variable formulation. We first express the latent effective purchase and sales 
prices of the factors as linear functions of observed variables (captured by the 
vector x) plus a household-specific random disturbance (captured by v): 
P- = a0. + c'x + vi, j=d,h; 
p±=R.+x+v1, j=d,h. 
14 Subscripts were chosen so that j = d denotes donum, the unit of land area 
commonly used in Turkey, and j = h denotes hours of labor. 
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We assume that the same household-specific random disturbance impacts both the 
effective sales and the purchase price.15 Next, we express the latent shadow 
prices of the factors as linear functions of x, plus a random disturbance 
which captures the unobserved factors unique to the 
(3) 5. = 
70j 
+ y x + w j=d,h. 
In anticipation of the identification issues 
define the reduced form parameters (it's) in 
parameters (a's, (3's and y's) as 




= a. J -1 
P1 - y1, j=d,h. 
household:'6 
wl 
which are discussed below, we 
terms of the common structural 
There are two reduced form parameters associated with each covariate. These 
measure the excess of that covariate's influence on the effective market price, 
over its influence on the shadow price, respectively for the sale (it-) and 
J 
purchase (7t+) side of the transaction. 
J 
Letting u1 = wj 
, 
vj, the adjustment regimes can be expressed in terms of 
the thresholds that u) s must cross, as shown in Table 4. Our objective is to 
estimate the reduced form parameters which determine the household-specific 
thresholds. Towards that end, we assume that the pair of random disturbances u i, 
uh are distributed independently of x as standard bivariate normal with 
correlation coefficient p. Letting g(, ;) denote the bivariate standard 
normal density and defining the parameter vectors *. = (n-., n+., n-', it+')' for 
0) -7i `1 
j = d and h, the likelihood function may be expressed as 
(5) L(14j,15h,p) = II J S g(ud,uh; p) duhdud 
(ad, ah) E AX. 4 J (ad) N(ap) 
where 17 denotes the product operator and the ranges of integration R(a) are 
given in Table 4. 
15 If distinct random disturbance terms are allowed in (1) and (2), estimation is 
no longer feasible. Our assumption confines integration to two dimensions -- 
rather than the four called for by the unrestricted model. Our actual point of 
departure was a slightly more general model: in place of (1) we had 
W) P: = ao. + a' x + 6v1, j=d,h. 
This allows unobserved heterogeneity to have a different impact on the sale and 
purchase sides of the market. Since our estimation procedure cannot identify b, 
we set it equal to l and left it out of equation (1). 
16 Our specification is in line with the usual treatment of shadow prices, which 
are obtained by linearizing a concave budget constraint. See Moffitt (1990). 
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The likelihood function is recognized as an unrestricted bivariate ordered 
probit model, in which the thresholds are allowed to be linear functions of the 
explanatory variables. The conventional ordered probit model imposes the testable 
restriction n- = tt+. It can be shown that the reduced form parameters 15 , 14 
i J --d -n 
and p are identified when all the cells of the 3 x 3 table have entries, which is 
the case in our empirical work.'? Inspection of the relationships given in (4) 
reveals that the structural parameters cannot be identified without additional 
assumptions. Providing any one of the a's, (3's or y's equal zero for a given 
element of the covariate vector, the remaining two are identified.18 
5. THE MAIN HYPOTHESES: 
Our latent variable formulation enables us to test several hypotheses which shed 
light on theoretical debates concerning agriculture. Three of these deserve 
special mention, because they illustrate what can be achieved by our methodology. 
Hypothesis 1: (Market Failure) Market imperfections induce significant 
differences between the sales and purchase prices 
exclude households from participation. 
of factors and selectivel>> 
We follow de Janvry et al. (1991) and interpret the existence of a non- 
trivial price band as evidence of market failure. From equations (1), (2) and (4) 
we find 
(6) P -P-=0i-(X +(Ria.)'x 
=tc+ -71-+(n+-1C-)'x. 
OJ Oi i -, - 
A non-trivial price band exists (in market j) if and only if p - p > 0. If 
market failure is not a selective phenomenon -- in the sense that specific 
conditions faced by a household do not determine participation status -- the width 
I7 Sufficiency can be shown as follows: consider a model without covariates. In 
that case five parameters have to be estimated, four constants and a correlation 
coefficient. The joint frequency distribution provides eight independent sources 
of information (the ninth is determined by the adding up restriction). Five 
parameters are easily retrievable from eight equations. When covariates are 
introduced, we have an additional condition similar to that in least squares 
regression: identification of the covariate effects requires that the data matrix 
be of full column rank. 
18 The distinction we have drawn between the structural and reduced form parameters 
of our model requires clarification. When non-tradable inputs are present, it is 
well-known that the separability between the production and consumption decisions 
of the household is lost. In this case input demands become functions of the 
household's endowments and shadow prices, as well as market prices. The shadow 
prices, in turn, become functions of the endowments and market prices (Strauss. 
1986; Seavey, 1987; de Janvry et al., 1991). Equations (1)-(3) are an 
intermediate step between the decision rule of the household, and the estimating 
equations, where we substituted for the endogenous variables on the right hand 
side and collected like terms. It should be clear that what we term "structural" 
parameters are not preference or technology parameters of the household. They 
serve as a convenient device for emphasizing the identification problems, which 
are manifestations of non-separability. 
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of the price band will be the same across households. A necessary and sufficient 
condition for homogeneity of the price band [((3. - cci)'x = 0 for all x] is 
n+ = 7t:, which we term the homogeneity restriction.19 
In a frictionless market p = p: would hold. The sufficient conditions are 
n+ = it: and tc+ = n-, which restore symmetry of the sales and purchase markets. i -i Oi of 
We refer to this extreme form of homogeneity as the symmetry restriction. In view 
of (4) neither form of homogeneity imposes any restrictions on the parameters of 
the shadow price equation. 
If the homogeneity restriction is rejected, the reasons behind market failure 
can be identified by focusing on the individual elements of the covariate vector. 
For example, it is possible to test the hypothesis put forward by de Janvey et al. 
(1991) that commercialization of agriculture (as captured by regional measures) 
decreases the likelihood of market failure (that is, the price band shrinks). If 
markets fail, household endowments of land and labor should figure in the decision 
to hire labor, and the decision to lease in land. Furthermore, when markets fail 
the logic of factor adjustment suggests that demand for land (labor) will be a 
decreasing function of the labor (land) endowment. Tests of these implications 
will shed further light on the appropriateness of our formulation. 
Hypothesis 2: (Interdependence) Adjustments that take place on the land and 
labor margins are interdependent. 
In our statistical model, adjustments on the labor and land margins are 
related through the correlation coefficient p. We therefore interpret evidence 
against the null hypothesis p = 0 as evidence in favor of interdependence. 
Recall that p = cov(ud,uh). Decomposition yields 
(7) p = cov(w,i,wh) + cov(v(l,vh) - cov(w,i,vh) - cov(vd,wh). 
It is not possible to sign p unless additional assumptions are made. In our 
empirical work we explore this issue further by experimenting with the covariate 
specifications in (1)-(3). 
Hypothesis 3: (Prohibitive Transaction Costs) Households which fail to 
adjust input margins are excluded from markets by prohibitively high transaction 
costs. 
Recall our transaction costs justification for divergence of effective sales 
and purchase prices. Using (7) it is possible to estimate the size of the price 
band, hence the magnitude of the transaction costs, faced by each household. If 
households fail to adjust the factor margins because they face prohibitive 
transaction costs, then those who do not adjust should collectively face 
significantly higher costs.20 Allowing for heterogenity, we pursue this line of 
19 Note that the homogeneity restriction is built into the conventional 
specification of the ordered probit model. Our formulation provides an economic 
interpretation of the conventional restriction. 
20 To be exact households in the (0,0) cell should have the highest total 
transaction costs, those who adjust both margins should have the lowest, and those 
who adjust only one margin should fall somewhere in between. Since we are unable 
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thinking on the respective margins (i) by testing the null hypothesis that the 
ordering of average predicted transaction costs by adjustment regime is as 
posited, and (ii) by testing the null hypothesis that between-regime variations in 
predicted transaction costs exceed within-regime variations. Evidence in favor of 
(i), but against (ii) would suggest that the comparative advantages that 
individual households have (as captured by the random disturbances), rather than 
differences in the magnitudes of the transaction costs, determine who adjusts and 
who does not. 
6. THE DATA AND THE EMPIRICAL SETTING: 
Our empirical work is based on a subsample of agricultural households extracted 
from the "Male Survey" portion of the "1973 Survey of Structure of Population and 
Population Problems" conducted by the Hacettepe Institute of Population Studies 
(HIPS) in Ankara, Turkey. The survey and the agricultural setting are described 
in detail in Tunali (1993). 
According to HIPS data, 88 percent of agricultural households own land. Of 
these 1015 (81 percent) self-cultivate. HIPS data provide detailed information on 
transactions involving land (see Figure 1 in Tunali, 1993). By comparison, 
information on the labor margin is rather limited. We classified households that 
hired either permanent wage laborers or casual workers on a regular basis as 
adjusting their labor pool upwards. Households that had at least one member who 
worked off the farm on a regular basis were classified as adjusting their labor 
endowment downwards. In the full sample of self-cultivating households shown in 
Table 1, two simultaneously leased land in and out, and 33 simultaneously hired 
labor in and out.21 These were excluded from our analysis. Since the theoretical 
debates which motivated our paper pertain to the family farm, we chose to exclude 
six households who owned land in excess of 500 d6num(125 acres). 
Further exclusions were called for because of data constraints.22 In our 
econometric work we therefore focus on a working sample of 754 owner-cultivators. 
The adjustment regimes chosen by these households are presented in Table 5. 
Observe that the cell proportions are almost identical to those we encountered in 
the full sample. Based on a Chi-square test, the null hypothesis that the 
to identify variances (see note 15) we cannot conduct the joint test. 
21 It is well-known that members of agricultural households engage in temporary 
migrations to work off the farm during lean periods (see Tunali, 1995). The same 
household might hire in casual labor during periods of peak agricultural activity. 
In the case of land, the household might lease out distant or otherwise unsuitable 
parcels of land and lease in elsewhere, to concentrate its activities in one area 
or one crop. Households which engage in simultaneous transactions can be 
classified by constructing a net adjustment measure. Unfortunately the 
information in our data set does not allow us to quantify the adjustments on the 
labor margin. 
22 Our method of constructing the household size variables (described in note 26 
below) required that 194 observations be dropped. Additional 26 observations were 
dropped because of missing or inconsistent information on the covariates. While 
all the geographic regions are represented in our working sample, statistical 
examination revealed that a larger percentage of households in regions other than 
the Central one were excluded. Implications of this are discussed below. 
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adjustments to the land and labor margins are independent (in the working sample) 
was handily rejected.23 
In the South Asian context factors such as property rights, labor laws, and 
the caste system have been identified as important determinants of observed 
patterns of tenancy and labor use (see Otsuka et al., 1990, pp.2003-5). In Turkey 
there are no legal restrictions on tenancy or the form it takes, nor on labor 
mobility, written or otherwise (Aksoy, 1984). While some remnants of feudalism 
persisted in the southeastern provinces at the time of the 1973 HIPS Survey, these 
were not included in the sampling frame (Tunali, 1993). These observations 
suggest that there is a good match between our empirical context, and the theory 
we are testing.24 
Comparison with census data reveals that our working sample represents above 
average activity on the land and labor margins.25 Since our objective is to test 
hypotheses concerning rare events, overrepresentation of market participants is a 
welcome situation. However, the fact that we may not have a random sample of 
family farms in Turkey calls for a cautious interpretation of the findings for 
policy purposes. 
The list of explanatory variables we relied on in operationalizing our latent 
variable formulation is given in Table 6, alongside the summary statistics. The 
average landowning male household head in our sample owns 46.6 d6num (about 12 
acres), is 47 years old, has more than two years of formal schooling, and has 
23 The value of the test statistic is 12.16. A Chi-square variate with 4 degrees 
of freedom exceeds this value with probability 0.016. 
24 Comparison with other studies which addressed a similar set of issues suggests 
that our data set, although somewhat dated, has the advantages of near-national 
coverage and moderately large sample size. We use data on 754 households drawn 
from 62 of Turkey's 67 provinces in 1973. Pant (1983) used ICRISAT data from six 
villages collected in 1975-76 and 1976-77. Sample size is not provided. Nabi 
(1985) used data from 4 villages in Pakistan, collected in 1976-77. Sample sizes 
are 194, 179, 73 and 114. Seavey (1987) used data from 256 villages, 17 states of 
India, collected in 1970-71, yielding a sample of size of 2862 (for the 
examination of land leasing and labor hiring decisions). Bell and Sussangkarn 
(1988) used data on 362 households from Thanjavur district in South India, 
collected in the early 1970s. Pereira and Sumner (1990) used ICRISAT data from 
six villages, over two years (which are not identified), and reported a sample 
size of 351. Shaban (1993) used ICRISAT data from 3 villages, collected over 
1975-84, with reported sample sizes of 353, 351, and 394. Skoufias (1994, 1995) 
also relied on ICRISAT data, obtained from 179 households in 6 villages, over the 
period 1975-84. 
25 According to the 1970 General Census of Agriculture, 86 percent of "small" 
agricultural households in Turkey -- whose operation sizes are comparable to those 
in our sample -- do not participate in short-term transactions involving land. 
Less than one percent of all self-cultivating households lease land out; 
evidently almost all landowning households that lease land out do not self- 
cultivate. Turning to the labor margin, census data reveal that 84 percent of 
cultivating households engage their labor entirely on the family farm. Data on 
the breakdown of the labor force by ownership status of land indicate that only 
about ten percent of the households' labor pool -- consisting of members aged 12 
years or older -- works either permanently or occasionally on others' holdings. 
- 12 - 
spent the last 22 years at the 1973 location of residence. The labor endowment of 
the average household consists of 3.6 adults, and one teenage child.26 
The data used in this study were collected after two decades of 
commercialization, namely increases in the use of agricultural machinery and 
fertilizer use, improvements in infrastructure and transportation equipment, and 
increases in the availability of farm credit at subsidized rates. However, not 
all regions were equally affected. That agroclimatic factors played an important 
role in influencing historical settlement patterns and the development of 
commercial agriculture in Turkey is well-documented (see Pamuk and Toprak, 1988: 
Keyder, 1989). We therefore relied on several variables to keep track of 
differences in the agronomic environment. The first seven variables. shown under 
this heading in Table 6 were compiled from publications of the State Institute of 
Statistics. Our rainfall variable measures the amount of rain recorded during the 
growing season (November to June) in the province in which the household resided. 
The next six covariates provide district level information. The first variable in 
this group records the proportion of villages in the district of residence which 
can rely on irrigation. The second and third variables respectively record 
activity in agricultural labor markets. The remaining three characterize 
cultivation practices. Information on quality of land, and region of residence 
came from the HIPS Survey. 
7. ESTIMATION RESULTS: 
Having taken the position that the characteristics of the household and the 
agronomic environment it operates in, determine the factor adjustment regime, we 
need to account for these determinants in our empirical work. Towards that end we 
experimented with a long list of conditioning variables implied by theory, and 
employed in the empirical literature. In what follows, we concentrate on a 
baseline model which we believe captures the essentials. The covariate vector of 
the baseline model consists of the first six household characteristics and the 
first seven agronomic environment variables listed in Table 6. We subsequently 
describe the specification checks we performed with the help of the remaining 
covariates. While the main results turned out to be robust to our sensitivity 
analyses, the findings from the latter shed light on secondary issues suppressed 
in the baseline model. 
Tests of the main hypotheses: 
We begin by summarizing what we learned from the baseline model with the aid of 
the statistics collected in Table 7. These pertain to the first step in our 
estimation procedure, which involved the maximization of (5). Based on the 
26 The data extract we worked with does not provide information on the demographic 
composition of the household. We therefore relied on conjectures about household 
composition to construct our household size variables, based on information on the 
age of the male respondent, his marital status, and the number of surviving 
children by sex. According to demographic data obtained from components of the 
1973 HIPS Survey which were not available to us, average age at marriage for women 
was 18, and fertility after age 45 was negligible (Toros, 1978). Since husbands 
typically are a few years older, we inferred that male household heads who are. 
younger than 30 years old would only have very young children, and those between 
30 and 40 years of age would have teenage children. By the same logic, children 
of older household heads (age > 40) are likely to be adults. Because girls marry 
off and leave the family farm, we excluded them from the count of adults. 
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likelihood ratio test, the baseline model with 13 covariates fits the data 
extremely well (p-value < 10-23). It also turns out to be the model of choice 
according to AIC. Of the models nested by the baseline model, both AIC and the 
likelihood ratio criterion favor model 3 over model 4. That is, the six household 
characteristics do a better job of classifying households according to the factor 
adjustment regime than the seven agronomic environment variables. Based on the 
likelihood ratio test, the homogeneity restriction (model 5) is handily rejected 
(p-value < 1.6x10-5). Thus the aggregate evidence overwhelmingly sides with the 
Market Failure hypothesis. 
Turning to the Interdependence hypothesis, we first focus on the model 
without covariates (model 2). We find that our parametric specification also 
rejects independence, corroborating the findings from the Chi-square tests. The 
null that p is zero is rejected in favor of the alternative that it is negative 
(p-value = .017). Observe that model 4 yields the same result. The correlation 
is driven to zero when household characteristics are included (see models I and 
3). This pattern indicates that interdependence is induced by the household 
characteristics. The fact that the residual correlation is driven to zero in the 
baseline model suggests that our specification not only captures land and labor 
endowments in a satisfactory fashion, but it also accounts for variations in 
farming experience. Further, it implies that in the Turkish context it is safe to 
study the tenancy market independently of the market for agricultural labor, and 
vice versa, providing factor endowments of the household are properly accounted 
for. 
Having found strong evidence of market failure, we turn to our third main 
hypothesis next and ask whether nonparticipant households are excluded from 
markets because of prohibitive transaction costs. To answer this question, we 
substitute the estimates of the threshold parameters obtained in the first step in 
(6) and obtain the Maximum Likelihood estimates of the household-specific 
transaction costs. Of the 2x754 costs predicted by our model, none were negative: 
this suggests that there are no outliers in our sample. 
Average values of the transaction costs predicted from the baseline model and 
their within-cell standard deviations are reported in Table 8. When we examined 
the patterns on the individual margins, average transaction costs indeed turned 
out to be significantly lower for households which adjusted one or more margins. 
Note, however, that within-cell variations are quite large. In fact ANOVA 
revealed that adjustment regime explains less than 6 percent of the variation in 
transaction costs.27 In light of the sizes of the within-cell variations, we 
reject hypothesis 3 and conclude that transaction costs are not prohibitive: 
participation status is determined on the basis of the comparative advantages that 
a household has in responding to the conditions it faces. As we show below, both 
regional factors and household characteristics play a role in establishing the 
27 ANOVA results were as follows: 
PTCLAND = 2.94 - 0.64 OUT - 0.26 IN, R2 = 0.039; 
(0.033) (0.15) (0.068) 
PTCLABOR = 1.95 - 0.23 OUT - 0.18 IN, R2 = 0.054. 
(0.019) (0.043) (0.035) 
Here PTCLAND and PCTLABOR denote the predicted transaction costs from equation 
(6), OUT takes on the value I if the household adjusts down, 0 otherwise, and IN 
takes on the value I if the household adjusts up, 0 otherwise. 
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edge needed for surmounting the costs of transacting. 
Can the empirical evidence amassed so far be reconciled with a different view 
of factor markets than the one we have adopted? We believe not. In fact, we 
already ruled out three explanations found in the literature in section 2. 
Nevertheless we find it useful to entertain two other alternatives which emerged 
during our deliberations. 
The first of these is motivated by a conjecture about agricultural 
technology. What if markets function about as well as they can be expected to 
function, but because of indivisibilities households which are close to their 
efficient input mix do not find it worthwhile to adjust?28 When we. examine the 
amounts traded in land transactions we find that 5 percent of the owner- 
cultivators who adjust their land holding downwards lease out 1 donum. or less; 10 
percent lease out 2 donum or less; 25 percent lease out 3 donum or less. Of 
those who increase their holding size, 5 percent lease in 2 donum or less; 10 
percent lease in 4 donum or less; 25 percent lease in 6 donum or less. The fact 
that small parcels of land change hands for the duration of the growing season 
suggests that land is not a lumpy factor. Put differently, fixed costs of 
contracting do not appear to bar farmers from land markets. This is a significant 
finding, because it suggests that the type of costs that matter are those which 
have to do with opportunistic behavior (in the form of effort witholding, 
misreporting of costs or output, and asset mismanagement), the very factors which 
render contracts incomplete. 
The second alternative explanation is based on a conjecture about household 
preferences. What if nonparticipating agricultural households simply have a taste 
for working on their own land, with their own resources? Clearly preferences may 
influence shadow prices and play a role in determining the adjustment patterns. 
However, if the premise that preferences are much less likely to impact effective 
prices is accepted, our transaction cost interpretation is on solid grounds. This 
follows from the fact that shadow prices cancel out in equation (6). 
In the remainder of this section we elaborate on the theme of transaction 
cost induced market failure by focusing on individual variables. 
Estimates of the threshold parameters: 
The Maximum Likelihood estimates of the threshold parameters of the baseline model 
are presented in Table 9. Variables which have positive coefficients increase the 
thresholds on the sales side (na and it) thereby increasing the likelihood of 
entering the sales market. They also push the thresholds on the purchase side 
(nd+ and nh) up and decrease the likelihood of entering the purchase market. 
Negative coefficients imply the opposite effects. It is worth pointing out that 
all the covariates included in the baseline model, except for the number of young 
children, are statistically different from zero (at the ten percent level of 
significance or better in two tail tests) in one or more columns. 
Observe that in the case of household characteristics, sign(na) = -sign(7r ) 
and sign(n i) = -sign(7th). That is, if a given household characteristic (read 
endowment) increases an adjustment threshold on one margin, it decreases the 
28 Strictly speaking this scenario is not in conflict with a transaction costs 
explanation, but it hints that presence of indivisibilities cannot be taken as 
evidence that markets fail. 
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corresponding adjustment threshold on the other. This pattern is easily 
reconciled with a factor ratio adjustment motive: households with high land/labor 
ratios (relative to the optimum) enter the factor markets to lower this ratio, 
while those with low land/labor ratios have the opposite objective. 
These observations have important implications about the manner in which 
markets function. Consider land markets first. We find that households are more 
likely to be sellers than buyers as their land endowment increases, and more 
likely to be buyers than sellers as their adult labor pool increases (p-values < 
.05). These results are in agreement with the findings reported by Bliss and 
Stern (1982), Pant (1983), Nabi (1985), Seavey (1987), Bell and Sussangkarn 
(1988), Kochar (1992), Shaban (1993) and Skoufias (1995). Turning to labor 
markets, we find the reverse is true: households are more likely to be buyers 
than sellers as their land endowment increases, and more likely to be sellers than 
buyers as their adult labor pool increases (p-values < .05). Seavey (1987) 
reports the same pattern. When markets exist and function properly, "... the 
number of workers in Baron Rothschild's vineyards should not depend on the number 
of daughters he has," as Benjamin (1992, p.288) put it. Thus our finding that 
land and labor endowments of the household have a bearing on who participates in 
markets lends further credence to our conclusion that markets fail.29 
Estimates of transaction costs: 
The tight link between our theoretical and econometric models allows us to go 
beyond reduced form correlations in drawing inferences about the reasons behind 
market failure. This is facilitated by the Maximum Likelihood estimates of the 
price band parameters reported in Table 10. In view of (6), variables that have 
positive coefficients in Table 10 widen the price wedge and hinder participation; 
those with negative coefficients reduce transaction costs and render adjustments 
more likely. Note that variables which do not have a significant effect on the 
width of the price band can still influence adjustment patterns. When they do, 
they push both the effective sales and the effective purchase price in the same 
direction, leaving the width of the price band unchanged. We therefore switch 
between Tables 9 and 10 as necessary. 
Starting with the agronomic environment variables, we find that cultivation 
practices have important implications for market participation. Some of these 
have a straightforward interpretation: for example, in areas where vineyards- 
orchards are found in larger concentration, incentive problems associated with 
short-term use of perennials dampen activity on the land margin (p-value = .017). 
Others are less obvious, especially when we invoke a commercialization 
interpretation. According to de Janvry et al. (1991), commercialization of 
agriculture facilitated by better infrastructure (such as improved transportation 
and irrigation facilities, wider availability of credit), better technology (such 
as improved seed varieties and fertilizers) will bring about a reduction in the 
size of the price band and thus increase participation in factor markets. This 
29 Benjamin (1992), Jacoby (1993) and Skoufias (1994) rely on measures of the 
demographic composition of the household for tests of departures from properly 
functioning labor market models. A crucial assumption in this undertaking is that 
the demographic composition of the household is exogenous. For example, if Baron 
Rotschild hires workers because he does not have sons, the exogeneity assumption 
would be violated. The independence between the long- and short-run adjustment 
regimes shown in section 2 vindicates our use of endowments as legitimate 
conditioning variables. 
- 16 - 
scenario applies to changes that take place over time. Keeping in mind that 
different regions of Turkey were at different junctures in the process of agrarian 
transformation in 1973, what can we say about the link between commercialization 
and participation in factor markets? 
Consider the case of water supplies: areas where rainfall and irrigation 
facilities can be depended upon typically favor commercialized agriculture. 
Increases in productivity (often realized through multiple cropping) and decreases 
in yield variation increase the value of land and the scope for entrepreneurship. 
While the prospect of greater potential damage from abusive use could discourage 
owners from leasing land, we would at the very least expect to find increased 
activity on the labor margin. The price band parameters on rainfall and 
irrigation facilities reported in Table 10 do not support this prediction. 
The magnitudes of the estimated threshold parameters reported in Table 9 
suggest a possible explanation for this apparent conflict with the 
commercialization hypothesis. We find that owner-cultivators who can benefit from 
irrigation facilities are indeed more likely to hire in wage labor. At the same 
time they are much less likely to hire out family labor: the estimated threshold 
coefficient on the sales side of the market (p-value = .036) is nearly two-and-a- 
half times that on the purchase side (p-value < .0001). That family labor becomes 
much more valuable when engaged on the family farm in areas where land is 
cultivated intensively lends credence to the view put forward by Datta and Nugent 
(1989, pp.58-9), who underscore the contractual complications brought about by the 
increased importance of timing, sequencing and input mix considerations. 
Effective use of modern inputs requires close supervision, which in turn adds to 
the costs of transacting. 
Where rain-fed grain cultivation is the only feasible farming activity, 
communities resort to the practice of setting sizable chunks of land aside for 
fallow in order to preserve soil moisture (Keyder, 1989). This practice is 
typically associated with relatively backward or traditional agriculture. Yet. 
our findings indicate that labor markets are more active in these areas. 
Examination of the threshold coefficient estimates reported in Table 9 reveals 
that there is increased activity on the sales side of the labor market (p-value = 
.012), and decreased activity on the sales side of the land market (p-value = 
.031). Evidently owner-cultivators residing in areas where fallow practice is 
common shun the sales market for land (because of communal restrictions on 
cultivated area) and enter the casual labor market (most likely to work for large 
farms during harvest time).30 
Strongest support for the commercialization hypothesis comes from our 
measures of labor market activity. We find that transaction costs are 
significantly lower for households residing in districts which receive, and send 
out agricultural labor (p-values < .005). We interpret the increased flow of 
workers as signs of better transportation and information links between markets. 
The reported patterns with agronomic environment variables turned out to be robust 
to changes in the model specification (discussed in some detail below). We 
conclude, then, that our findings lend guarded support for the commercialization 
30 In her detailed study of agricultural practices in Central Turkey, Bazoglu- 
Balamir (1984) points out that labor market activity associated with rain-fed 
grain cultivation is confined to harvest labor. Since the information in our data 
set does not allow us to distinguish labor use by task, we were unable to pursue 
this lead. 
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hypothesis of de Janvry et al. (1991). 
Turning to the household characteristics, we find two factors exert 
statistically and economically significant influence on both margins: schooling 
of the male household head and the number of adults. Why schooling should reduce 
transaction costs is easily understood: educated farmers can mitigate information 
problems and become better monitors/managers of hired and family resources. Our 
findings indicate that households can substitute quantity for quality and achieve 
the same result on the labor margin: farms which can count on a larger pool of 
adult members find it easier to participate in labor markets. The effect of an 
additional year of formal schooling is a shade below that of an adult, a result 
which underscores the importance of education. 
Checks on the baseline specification: 
According to the threshold parameter estimates reported in Table 9, households 
with a large labor endowment are more likely to lease land in, and less likely to 
lease land out. The net effect captured in Table 10 however, is increased 
relience on own land. Why larger households should face higher transaction costs 
in the land market is not easily understood. Elaborations on the baseline 
specification revealed nonlinearities, but did not resolve the issue.31 
Evidence from around the World and Turkey is that small farms use labor more 
intensively (Sell, 1981; Ministry of Agriculture, 1967). The extra labor is 
directed at investment activities -- such as land leveling, bunding, improving 
drainage and roads, and topsoil conservation -- which increase land quality. 
Could it be that our failure to control for land quality is responsible for the 
observed pattern? To pursue this logic, we added the land quality indicators 
listed in Table 6 into the model. We found that better than average land quality 
increased the likelihood of hiring in labor. Households with poorer than average 
land were more likely to hire out, and less likely to hire in labor. However the 
impact of the number of adults on the land margin remained the same. Apart from 
noting that the evidence in our sample corroborates the pattern of labor intensive 
cultivation by small landowners, we do not have a transaction costs explanation 
for our finding. 
Why households headed by older males should face higher transaction costs in 
the labor market is also a puzzle. We pursued this issue by adding years in the 
village into our baseline model. This wiped out the effect of age, but confronted 
us with another puzzle: the longer the household resides in a community, the less 
likely it is to participate in land markets (p-value = .0035). Based on 
information arguments one would expect the opposite. Could it be that longer 
residence allows the households to make long-run adjustments? To answer this 
question, we added the long-run adjustment variables (had migrants, bought or sold 
land) into the equation. They turned out to be statistically nonsignificant, and 
increased duration continued to be detrimental to participation. 
31 We found that households benefit from increases in the number of adult members 
until they reach an optimal size of 3.3; beyond that participation in land 
markets becomes increasingly costly. This figure is based on a model in which the 
baseline model was augmented by including quadratic terms for the amount of land, 
age of the male head, and number of adults. The joint significance of the 
quadratic terms could not be established using a likelihood ratio test (p-value = 
0.17). The price band parameter for the number of adults was statistically 
significant (p-value = .063) on the land margin. 
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Returning to Table 10, we see that the land endowment of the household does 
not influence the width of the price bands. If we invoke the collateral 
interpretation of Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), access to credit markets appears to 
be equal. Accounts given in Bazoglu-Balamir (1984), Pamuk and Toprak (1988), and 
Keyder (1989) support this interpretation. To pursue the issue of market 
imperfections further, we included animal wealth and the number of draft animals 
owned by the household as additional regressors. We envision two different 
interpretations of the role played by animal wealth: first, viewed as a measure 
of the household's financial reserves, higher animal wealth should make it easier 
for the household to circumvent working capital constraints and engage in 
transactions. Second, seen as an indicator of specialization, higher animal 
wealth would signal the fact that the household's comparative advantage is not in 
farming, but in husbandry. Our results suggest that the second interpretation 
dominates: households with higher animal wealth are less likely to enter land 
markets as cultivators (p-value = .006). 
In light of the moral hazard problems associated with their rental use, the 
literature views draft animals as non-tradable inputs. As such, they should 
influence the adjustment regime of the household. Since draft animals are engaged 
in traditional methods of agriculture, their presence signals lack of 
commercialization. In line with this interpretation, we find that households 
which rely on draft animals for cultivation are less likely to enter labor markets 
(p-value < .05). 
For a final check on our specification we relied on the regional dummies 
identified in Table 6, choosing the grain producing Central region as our 
reference category. The region dummies turned out to be highly significant, but 
did not alter the conclusions drawn from the baseline model.32 Results indicated 
that land markets in all four regions were more active compared to those in the 
Central region, and labor markets in the Western region were more active compared 
to others. 
8. CONCLUSION: 
Imperfections, in the form of missing or less than smoothly functioning markets, 
appear to have wide appeal in the literature on backward, even modern agriculture. 
Recent efforts to operationalize the role of transaction costs -- such as that by 
de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991) -- offer an attractive analytical 
framework for examining the role played by imperfections in generating observed 
household behavior. Our paper constitutes an attempt to confront this promising 
line of theoretical research with real world data, in the context of markets for 
tenancy and agricultural labor. Our model can distinguish between competing views 
of the manner in which markets function; further, our econometric formulation 
enables us to test for the presence of market imperfections with rather limited 
amounts of data. 
A striking feature that Turkish agriculture shares with many less developed 
countries is the overwhelming incidence of owner-cultivation based on family 
resources. Why households do not adjust their endowments of land and labor, and 
how difficulties of adjustment on one margin might influence the other margin, are 
questions we address in this paper. Our findings forcefully show that systematic 
differences in household characteristics and the agricultural environment they 
32 The likelihood ratio test favored inclusion of the region variables (p-value < 
.0061). AIC value was 2349, a shade below that of the baseline model. 
- 19 - 
face, influence the choices of households among various adjustment regimes. Thus, 
we side with the view that market failure is a household-specific phenomenon, and 
not a universal condition. 
We believe this view offers a much needed synthesis for operationalizing 
theoretical models of a rational agent in environments characterized by 
imperfections. As we have shown, efficiency considerations indeed are at the 
heart of the adjustments that take place in factor markets. However, when costs 
of transacting impose a sufficiently high burden, exchange does not take place -- 
owner-cultivators make do with their own resources. Markets reward those 
households which have an edge in surmounting the costs of transacting by allowing 
them to reap the benefits of exchange. 
- 20 - 
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